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Nudge for Good? Choice Defaults
and Spillover Effects
Claus Ghesla †, Manuel Grieder* and Jan Schmitz*
Department of Humanities, Social and Political Sciences, Chair of Economics, Swiss Federal Institute of Technology (ETH)
Zurich, Zurich, Switzerland
Policy makers increasingly use choice defaults to promote “good” causes by influencing
socially relevant decisions in desirable ways, e.g., to increase pro-environmental choices
or pro-social behavior in general. Such default nudges are remarkably successful when
judged by their effects on the targeted behaviors in isolation. However, there is scant
knowledge about possible spillover effects of pro-social behavior that was induced by
defaults on subsequent related choices. Behavioral spillover effects could eliminate or
even reverse the initially positive effects of choice defaults, and it is thus important to
study their significance. We report results from a laboratory experiment exploring the
subsequent behavioral consequences of pro-social choice defaults. Our results are
promising: Pro-social behavior induced by choice defaults does not result in adverse
spillover effects on later, subsequent behavior. This finding holds for both weak and
strong choice defaults.
JEL Classification: C91, D01, D04
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1. INTRODUCTION
Behavioral policy interventions from the toolkits of psychology and behavioral economics have
gained increasing attention recently (e.g., List and Price, 2016; Liebe et al., 2018, for reviews of the
literature). The goal of such interventions is to steer behavior in a desired direction when the use
of classical policy instruments, such as taxes, subsidies, or command-and-control regulation, is not
feasible and policies need to rely on the voluntary participation of actors (e.g., Croson and Treich,
2014; Kesternich et al., 2017).
One particularly prominent behavioral policy instrument are choice defaults. Policy makers
(and other practitioners) make increasing use of choice defaults because they believe that defaults
offer successful and cost-effective ways of triggering behavior change. Indeed, choice defaults
appear to be very effective nudges for promoting “good” causes. For instance, defaults successfully
promote pro-environmental choices such as the uptake of green energy contracts (Pichert and
Katsikopoulos, 2008; Ebeling and Lotz, 2015), they strongly impact charitable donations (Altmann
et al., 2014; Goswami and Urminsky, 2016), and they help increase retirement savings (Choi et al.,
2003; Cronqvist and Thaler, 2004). Thus, even though there is a lively debate on the ethicality of
using defaults as nudges (Bovens, 2009; Hausman and Welch, 2010; Desai, 2011; Sunstein, 2015),
their distributional effects (Brown et al., 2011; Loefgren et al., 2012), and whether their use fits
the criteria of “libertarian paternalism” (Carroll et al., 2009; Keller et al., 2011; Ghesla, 2017b), the
effectiveness of default nudges for promoting “good” causes has generally been taken for granted.
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However, for an accurate assessment of the overall effects
of default nudges on a socially desired behavior, policy makers
should take into account not only the direct impact of default
nudges on targeted choices, but also potential spillover effects
of the initial behavior triggered by the default on subsequent,
related behaviors (see also d’Adda et al., 2017).1 In principle, such
behavioral spillovers could amplify, eliminate or even reverse the
initially positive effects of choice defaults, when judging their
impact on the aggregate of relevant behaviors (for overviews see
Truelove et al., 2014; Dolan and Galizzi, 2015). For instance, if
nudging someone into a charitable donation crowds out other
pro-social acts in the future, e.g., because of moral licensing
(Khan and Dhar, 2006; Sachdeva et al., 2009; Mazar and Zhong,
2010), the net effect of the choice default for promoting pro-
social behavior is clearly less positive—and could even become
negative—than when no such spillover occurs.
In this paper, we use a laboratory experiment to study spillover
effects of pro-social behavior triggered by choice defaults in a
first stage on a subsequent pro-social behavior in a second stage.
Our study is thus an intervention study of spillover effects (see
Sintov et al., 2019), investigating whether default interventions
can trigger behavioral spillovers to non-targeted, subsequent
behavior. By doing so, our paper contributes to and links two
strands of literature: on the one hand the literature studying
behavioral spillovers (e.g., Meritt et al., 2010; Truelove et al., 2014;
Dolan and Galizzi, 2015) and on the other hand the literature
studying the effects of default nudges on pro-environmental
or pro-social behavior (e.g., Thaler and Sunstein, 2003; Pichert
and Katsikopoulos, 2008; Metcalfe and Dolan, 2012; Altmann
et al., 2014; Sunstein and Reisch, 2014; Ebeling and Lotz, 2015;
Goswami and Urminsky, 2016). To the best of our knowledge,
there is only the study by d’Adda et al. (2017) that also links the
literature on nudging interventions to the literature on behavioral
spillovers and investigates the potential spillover effects of pro-
social behavior triggered by nudges on subsequent behavior.
D’Adda et al. (2017) use a similar design as ours in order
to test relevant behavioral spillovers induced by various policy
interventions, including a number of typical “nudges” such as
choice defaults and information about social norms. They find
that behavior influenced by traditional policy interventions in
the form of monetary incentives or contractual regulation had
positive spillover effects (mainly because of anchoring effects),
whereas behavior triggered by nudging interventions had no
spillover effects. However, with regard to choice defaults their
results remained inconclusive, as their default manipulation
did not produce a significant effect on the initial behavior. In
our study, we ensured that the default manipulations yielded
statistically significant effects on the targeted initial pro-social
behavior. This allows testing the spillover effects of pro-social
behavior triggered by successful default nudges on subsequent
1Note that in this paper we narrow down the term spillover effects to the effect of
an initial behavior triggered by the default on related subsequent behavior. In the
literature, the term spillover effect is also used to describe the backfiring of policy
instruments because of psychological reactance to a given policy leading to direct
adverse effects on the targeted initial behavior (Schultz et al., 2007), or to explain
so-called rebound effects due to individual adjustments to relative price changes,
which are induced by a given policy (Alcott, 2005).
related decisions that were not directly targeted by the initial
default nudge.
The existing empirical literature on behavioral spillovers in
sequential pro-social decisions points to the possibility of moral
licensing. After a first good deed, people can feel licensed to
subsequently act in a negative way, thus resulting in negative
spillovers of the initial positive behavior on the subsequent
behavior (e.g., Monin and Miller, 2001; Jacobsen et al., 2010;
Meritt et al., 2010; Conway and Peetz, 2012; Harding and Rapson,
2013; Tiefenbeck et al., 2013; Achtziger et al., 2015; Clot et al.,
2016). As effective choice defaults in our setting increase pro-
social behavior in the initial decision, they may trigger moral
licensing tendencies leading people to compensate their high
initial pro-social behavior (i.e., pro-social giving triggered by
a default in our experiment) by subsequently less pro-social
behavior. As such compensating behavior would undermine the
overall effectiveness of default interventions, it is important
to study whether pro-social behavior fostered through the use
of pro-social default options leads to negative spillovers on
subsequent, non-targeted pro-social behavior.
Contrary to moral licensing, the literature on behavioral
spillovers also documents moral consistency effects according to
which increased pro-social choices triggered by an intervention
like a choice default should lead to even more pro-social
behavior subsequently. However, many studies finding moral
consistency did so in set-ups where the subsequent behavior
was in the opposite domain than the initial behavior (i.e., pro-
social behavior followed by anti-social behavior or vice versa,
e.g., Freedman and Fraser, 1966; Beaman et al., 1983; Cialdini
et al., 1995; Burger, 1999; Knez and Camerer, 2000; Fitzsimons
and Shiv, 2001; Cherry et al., 2003; Grimm and Mengel, 2012;
Baca-Motes et al., 2013; Brandon et al., 2017). As the goal of
our study was to to investigate the behavioral spillover effects
associated with choice defaults designed for fostering desirable,
pro-social behavior, participants in our study faced an initial and
a subsequent decision from the same domain (pro-social giving).
This is different frommaking anti-social (e.g., cheating) decisions
that harm others. Moreover, in set-ups with behavioral spillovers
within the same (positive) domain (e.g., pro-environmental acts),
positive spillovers are more likely when the conditions favor
potential mediating mechanisms such as self-efficacy (as people
learn that they are able and willing to perform certain behaviors,
e.g., Steinhorst et al., 2015; Lauren et al., 2016), the cognitive
accessibility of recent relevant behaviors (Sintov et al., 2019),
or, relatedly, the self-signaling value of the behavior (Gneezy
et al., 2012). By their nature, choice defaults do not seem
likely to trigger these mediating pathways that could lead to
positive spillovers, as defaults tend to affect behavior without
people being explicitly aware of it (e.g., Smith et al., 2013), thus
not fostering self-efficacy and making the pro-social behavior
less easily cognitively accessible and thus also less relevant
for self-signalling.
While previous literature thus suggests that moral licensing
tendencies could be expected to occur if pro-social behavior is
triggered by a choice default in a first decision, in our experiment
we do not find that increased pro-social behavior triggered
by choice defaults leads to negative spillovers on subsequent
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pro-social behavior that was not directly targeted by the default
nudge. These results carry some positive messages for policy
makers and choice architects. On the basis of our findings,
there is currently no reason that choice architects need to
worry about negative spillover effects from the use of pro-social
choice defaults.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.
Section 2 presents the experimental design. In section 3
behavioral hypotheses are presented. Section 4 summarizes
the study results. Section 5 discusses relevant findings
and concludes.
2. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
To study whether choice defaults in a first initial decision
affect behavior in an untreated subsequent decision we based
our experimental design on a “sequential behavior paradigm,”
which is typically used to study behavioral spillover effects
experimentally (Mullen and Monin, 2016). For both decisions,
we implemented dictator games (Kahneman et al., 1986; Forsythe
et al., 1994) in order to have two very similar pro-social deeds as
an instrument to uncover potential spillover effects of a default in
one decision on a related subsequent decision without a default.
The dictator game is a standard game in experimental economics
and psychology with typically two players. One player is an
active decision maker (she) who receives a certain monetary
endowment, which she is free to divide between herself and
another (passive) player, the recipient (he). The recipient can
be another person, but he can also be an environmental or
social cause or charity to which decision makers can donate
to. Importantly, the recipient cannot influence how much the
decision maker decides to transfer and he has no way of rejecting
the transfer. The game thus serves as a measure of voluntary pro-
social behavior by the decision maker. It has been extensively
used in pro-social decision research (see Engel, 2011, for a meta-
analysis).
Specifically, in our study, in the first decision participants
played a dictator game paired with a charity as the recipient
(“Dictator Stage I”). In the subsequent second decision,
participants played another dictator game in which they were
paired with a randomly allotted person in the same laboratory
session (“Dictator Stage II”). In both stages, participants could
be either selfish (and keep the money for themselves) or pro-
social (and share some of their endowment with the recipient).
Importantly, if there are spillover effects, the decision in Dictator
Stage II may depend on the behavior in Dictator Stage I and on
the presence and strength of a choice default in that stage.
2.1. Method and Procedures
2.1.1. Dictator Stage I
Participants played a dictator game paired with a recipient in
form of a charitable organization. They could choose from
nine different charities, which served a well-balanced set of
purposes, such as charities that deal with environmental and
nature conservation, human rights, or health related matters.
Thus, we tried to preclude situations in which participants would
have liked to donate, but could not find a suitable charity to
do so (Crumpler and Grossman, 2008). Participants received
information on each charity by reading a statement of purpose.2
Participants received information about each charity, which
they had to read before they were able to make a choice.3 Once
they had read about all charities, participants decided to which
of the nine charities (only one could be selected) and how much
to give. Participants received a total amount of 200 experimental
points (ECU) for their choice, of which they kept 100 points as
a show-up fee. 100 ECU remained to decide on how much to
donate to a charity. Participants also had the option to donate
nothing and keep all experimental points for themselves.
We implemented three treatment variations in Dictator
Stage I:
1. NODEFAULT: Participants could choose actively if and how
much to donate to a charity. They had to actively type the
desired amount into an input box. The input box was initially
blank.
2. WEAK DEFAULT: We nudged participants into being fully
pro-social and donating the maximum possible amount to
a charity by default. The default donation was thus pre-
set to the maximum amount participants could donate (100
ECU). Participants could change the pre-set amount simply
by clicking on a box and entering the desired donation.
3. STRONG DEFAULT: We again nudged participants into
being fully pro-social by setting the default donation to the
maximum possible amount that could be donated. In order
to change the amount, participants first had to perform a
slider task (Gill and Prowse, 2018). Specifically, to change the
default donation, participants had to shift 48 sliders to a value
of 50. Only after having completed the task, participants
could change the donation amount. If they did not complete
the slider task, they had to donate the default amount.
Many defaults used in charitable giving (Altmann et al., 2014) or
pro-environmental settings (see Brown et al., 2013; Egebark and
Ekstroem, 2016) are comparable to our weak default treatment.
However, the literature provides multiple explanations for why
people stick to defaults. For example, defaultsmay be set such that
it may be rational to follow the default (Croson and Treich, 2014),
they may convey information about certain choices over others
and signal quality (Dinner et al., 2011; Coffman et al., 2015), or
following the default may simply be cognitively less challenging
(Sintov and Schultz, 2017). The latter point indicates that often,
defaults seem to work (i.e., people stay with the default) because
it is laborious for people to make an active choice and to opt
out of the default. Our strong default treatment thus varies the
cost of opting out. Taken together, our two default treatments
accommodate the fact that opting-out of the default may be more
or less complex in different situations.
We completed the experimental design with a two-tiered
control strategy:
2These statements were taken from the website of Zewo Foundation, a Swiss
institution that certifies charitable organizations with respect to integrity, efficient
use of funds, and transparency, see www.zewo.ch/en/
3Appendix C in Supplementary Material displays the instructions provided to
participants and screen-shots of the decision screens.
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1. CONTROL INCOME: Participants did not participate
actively in Dictator Stage I, but received lump-sum payments
in addition to their show-up fees. The amounts of these
lump-sum payments were derived from the distributions
of donation amounts participants chose in the treatment
conditions outlined above. Thus, each donation decision
in the NO DEFAULT, WEAK DEFAULT, and STRONG
DEFAULT treatments was matched with a lump-sum
payment a participant received in the CONTROL INCOME
condition. In purely monetary terms, participants in
CONTROL INCOME thus arrived at Dictator Stage II in
exactly the same situation as a matched participant from
one of the treatments, however without having made a
donation decision in Dictator Stage I. Eliminating Dictator
Stage I behavior while controlling for any possible income
effects provides us with a conservative baseline to which we
can compare the Dictator Stage II decisions in our three
main treatments.
2. CONTROL PASSIVE GIVING: Participants received the
identical lump-sum payments according to the same
procedure as participants in CONTROL INCOME. Yet, they
did participate (to a limited extent) in Dictator Stage I by
choosing the charity to which a pre-defined donation was
made. By letting participants choose the charity to which
the donation was administered, we made sure that the
altruistic utility component, i.e., the individual knowledge
that there had been a donation in Dictator Stage I was
comparable to participants’ utility in the NO DEFAULT,
WEAK DEFAULT, and STRONG DEFAULT treatments.4
Additionally, as participants read about the charities in
Dictator Stage I in the treatment condition, this condition
also controls for any possible priming effects of that task on
the subsequent decision in Dictator Stage II.
2.1.2. Dictator Stage II
Participants played a standard dictator game with another
participant as the recipient. Each participant was thus paired
randomly with another participant in the same session. Both
participants remained completely anonymous with respect to
each other and were not able to influence the other participant’s
decision. To maximize the number of observations, we used a
variant of the strategy method (Selten, 1967) and elicited choices
for both roles of the dictator and the recipient respectively.
The strategy method is a common experimental procedure
to elicit all possible choices in a behavioral game from one
participant (see Brandts and Charness, 2011, for a more detailed
discussion and for evidence that treatment effects found in direct
response experiments also replicate with the strategy method).
In our setting this meant that we asked participants to make
decisions for both roles that exist in the game, the dictator (i.e.,
how much of their endowment would they like to share with
the recipient) and the recipient. Each participant thus decided
on the allocation of 200 experimental points between herself
4What this condition does not control for is the warm-glow (Andreoni, 1990)
stemming from the donation decision in Dictator Stage I. This is intentional, as it
is exactly this warm-glow (i.e., the feeling of having done something good) which
may yield a spillover effect and affect participants’ decisions in Dictator Stage II
(Schmitz, forthcoming).
and the paired recipient. However, it was common knowledge
that only one decision of each pair of participants was going
to be implemented, and that the computer would randomly
determine which one. Dictator Stage II was completely identical
for participants in all treatments and control conditions. The
decisions made in this stage constitute our main dependent
variable. Table 1 summarizes the experimental parameters.
2.1.3. Participants and Procedures
We conducted 23 sessions with a total of 678 participants
at the Decision Science Laboratory (DeSciL) at ETH Zurich.
The recruitment process followed standard protocols at the
laboratory and we did not apply any exclusion rules, e.g.,
based on study or subject level. We recruited participants using
hroot, a software tool frequently used to recruit participants
for behavioral economics experiments and that allows for
randomized invitation to experimental sessions (see Bock
et al., 2014). The participant pool consisted of students at
the University of Zurich and the Swiss Federal Institute of
Technology (ETH) in Zurich. In our final sample, 53% of
participants were women and the mean age was 22.9 years.
Table A1 in Appendix A (Supplementary Material) provides
further descriptive statistics on the participant sample (including,
in addition to age and gender, measures for income, education,
Big 5 traits, need for cognition, reactance, regret, and IQ for each
of the experimental conditions as well as in the sample overall.)
We collected data for the NO DEFAULT, WEAK DEFAULT
and the corresponding control conditions in June, July and
September 2016. The data for the STRONG DEFAULT and
its corresponding control conditions were collected in May
and June 2018. It is possible that unobserved changes in the
participant pool between 2016 and 2018 could have affected
participants’ behavior. However, when we compare the 2016
and the 2018 data of the corresponding control conditions
(CONTROL INCOME and CONTROL PASSIVE GIVING), we
do not find any significant differences in behavior (p > .100
for all comparisons), which is why we pool the data from 2016
and 2018 for the analyses. Figure 1 provides an illustration of
the data collection timeline. Each box in the figure represents an
experimental session and displays the experimental condition(s)
implemented in that session.
In order to obtain the amounts and the distribution of
the lump-sum payments (X̂) in the control groups, we ran
four sessions of NO DEFAULT and WEAK DEFAULT first
(in the 2016 wave). Subsequently, we varied treatments and
control between sessions5 and sessions were executed such
that treatments and controls were evenly distributed across
different times and days. We followed the same procedure
for the STRONG DEFAULT treatment and the corresponding
CONTROL INCOME and CONTROL PASSIVE GIVING
conditions in the data collection wave in 2018. Thus, we first
conducted four sessions in the STRONG DEFAULT treatment
to gather information about giving in Dictator Stage I and the
5One treatment session was conducted in a within fashion due to unbalanced show
up of participants. Results of this single session are not significantly different with
respect to the remaining sessions [Kolmogorov-Smirnov test n1 = 24, n2 = 234,
p = 0.435 (distribution of giving in Dictator Stage I), n1 = 24, n2 = 234, p = 0.139
(distribution of giving in Dictator Stage II)].
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TABLE 1 | Overview of experimental parameters.
Dictator Stage I Dictator Stage II
Show-up fee ECU for decision ECU for decision
T1 NO DEFAULT 100 100 200
T2 WEAK DEFAULT 100 100 200
T3 STRONG DEFAULT 100 100 200
C1 CONTROL INCOME 100+X̂ – 200
C2 CONTROL PASSIVE GIVING 100+X̂ Fixed: (100-X̂) 200
Participants in CONTROL INCOME and CONTROL PASSIVE GIVING received a lump-sum payment X̂ matching the distribution of the donated amounts in Dictator Stage I in the
treatment conditions (see Appendix B in Supplementary Material for details on the matching procedure). In Dictator Stage II, each participant decided on the allocation of 200 ECU,
however, only one decision within each participant pair was implemented. 100 ECU ≡ CHF 10.
FIGURE 1 | The figure illustrates the timeline of our data collection. Each box represents one experimental session (lasting for around 50min each), the label indicates
the experimental condition implemented in that session and, in parentheses, we indicate the number of participants in the session. The split box at the very bottom for
September 2016 indicates the one treatment session that we conducted in a within fashion in order to balance cell-sizes because of no-shows in previous sessions
(see Footnote 5).
income distribution for Dictator Stage II. We computerized
the experiment using z-tree, a software tool frequently used
in experimental economics that allows conducting anonymous
interactive decision making experiments in the laboratory (see
Fischbacher, 2007). An experimental session lasted roughly
50 minutes.
At the beginning of a session, participants were randomly
assigned to computer-equipped cubicles. Common rules for
participation were read aloud and participants signed a consent
form. They received on-screen instructions for each part
of the study (see Appendix C in Supplementary Material
that contains the entire set of experimental instructions
provided to participants). Participants knew that the study
would consist of several parts, but the contents of each
part were not revealed before the respective instructions were
provided. In order to ensure comprehension, participants had
to answer control questions before each part. When participants
had comprehension questions, the experimenter answered
individually and in private.
Participants first completed Dictator Stage I (except in
CONTROL INCOME). Subsequently, we included a filler task
between Dictator Stage I and II. In this task, participants
completed a shortened version of an IQ-test after Catell (1940).
The test was divided into two parts, each part lasting for
exactly 90 seconds. The intention of the filler task was to
temporally separate Dictator Stage I and II. This separation
may be of importance when reviewing the proposed underlying
psychological mechanisms of consistency or licensing effects.
One line of research argues that individuals store moral credits
when behaving “good,” which they then use later on, for instance,
to offset a subsequent behavior (Jordan et al., 2011). Another line
of research states that individuals use initial “good” behavior as
a credential to interpret negative subsequent behavior as non-
negative (Monin and Miller, 2001). The filler task serves both
mechanisms as, on the one hand, it provided sufficient time for
participants to build up moral credits, and on the other hand,
it was still short enough so that in the subsequent behavior
participants would remember their initial behavior. Additionally,
the filler task limits the potential for demand (Zizzo, 2010) and
anchoring effects (e.g., d’Adda et al., 2017) and adds to the
external validity of the results, as in relevant real-life settings
an initial behavior is most likely not followed immediately by a
relevant subsequent behavior. After the filler task, participants
proceeded to Dictator Stage II. Upon completion of these tasks,
they received feedback on their final payoff and were asked to
fill in a supplemental questionnaire. The average payment was
approximately CHF 26. Moreover, participants donated CHF
2,155 to the nine different charities.
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3. BEHAVIORAL PREDICTIONS AND
HYPOTHESES
The experiment was designed to study potential behavioral
spillover effects arising from initial pro-social giving behavior on
subsequent giving behavior in a related decision. Particularly, we
were interested in testing whether the use of choice defaults that
triggered giving in the initial behavior in Dictator Stage I would
affect behavioral spillovers to the subsequent decision in Dictator
Stage II.
To guide our analysis in section 4, we provide behavioral
predictions and testable hypotheses grounded in existing
literature in this section. Because we want to test the effect of
behavioral spillovers following pro-social behavior in conditions
with a pre-set default, we first present hypotheses about Dictator
Stage I giving behavior in the differently strong default treatments
in section 3.1. Further, we present hypotheses about potential
spillover effects arising from giving in Dictator Stage I on giving
behavior in Dictator Stage II in section 3.2.
3.1. The Effect of Defaults on Giving in
Dictator Stage I
A large body of literature documents that when presented with
choice defaults, individuals oftentimes follow the pre-set option
(e.g., Thaler and Sunstein, 2003; Altmann et al., 2014; Ebeling and
Lotz, 2015). As we are interested in identifying potential spillover
effects of pro-social behavior induced by choice defaults on
subsequent, non-targeted pro-social behavior, providing further
evidence for the direct effects of choice defaults is not the main
concern of our study. However, to be able to study potential
spillover effects, we first need to establish the presence of a default
effect in our study on the directly targeted pro-social behavior
(giving in Dictator Stage I). Specifically, we use two different
defaults in Dictator Stage I. The defaults differ in the effort level
required to change the pre-set donation amount. While reasons
to follow default decisions are diverse, the literature also indicates
that effort is a prime factor preventing individuals to change pre-
set choices (Brown et al., 2013; Altmann et al., 2014; Egebark and
Ekstroem, 2016; Sintov and Schultz, 2017). Based on the existing
literature on choice defaults, we thus present Hypotheses 1a-c:
Hypothesis 1: The effect of defaults on giving in Dictator
Stage I
H1a The weak default nudge increases giving in Dictator Stage I
compared to giving in the no default condition.
H1b The strong default nudge increases giving in Dictator Stage
I compared to giving in the no default condition.
H1c The strong default nudge increases giving in Dictator Stage
I compared to the weak default nudge.
Note that a non-rejection of H1a and H1b is indispensable to
study our main research question which concerns the impact of
choice defaults on potential spillover effects of first on second
stage behavior (see Hypothesis 2 below). Thus, without the
significant effects of defaults on giving in Dictator Stage I,
an analysis of possible spillover effects on Dictator Stage II
is obsolete.
3.2. Spillover Effects Arising From Giving in
Dictator Stage I
Hypothesis 1 thus merely represents a necessary condition
to investigate spillover effects from default induced giving in
Dictator Stage I on giving in Dictator Stage II. Behavioral
spillover effects in decision settings without choice defaults have
been widely studied and the related literature on behavioral
spillover effects from identical and closely related pro-social
decisions points to the importance of moral licensing (e.g.,
Schmitz, forthcoming; Tiefenbeck et al., 2013; Hofmann et al.,
2014; Achtziger et al., 2015; Effron and Conway, 2015; Sass
et al., 2015). Individuals who give to others (or to charity) in a
first decision tend to show less of this behavior in subsequent
giving decisions. Since we use two related consecutive pro-social
decisions it is likely to observe negative behavioral spillovers
in our setting too. Following the arguments presented in the
literature, higher giving induced by the default in Dictator Stage
I should lead to negative spillover effects on giving in Dictator
Stage II. We present Hypotheses 2a-c:
Hypothesis 2: The spillover effects of charitable giving in
default conditions in Dictator Stage I on giving in Dictator
Stage II
H2a Compared to the no default condition, the higher initial
giving to charity induced by the weak choice default in
Dictator Stage I leads to lower giving in Dictator Stage II.
H2b Compared to the no default condition, the higher initial
giving to charity induced by the strong choice default in
Dictator Stage I leads to lower giving in Dictator Stage II.
H2c Compared to the weak default condition, the higher initial
giving to charity induced by the strong choice default in
Dictator Stage I leads to lower giving in Dictator Stage II.
These moral licensing hypotheses stand in contrast to literature
describing moral consistency effects, i.e., higher pro-social
behavior following anti-social behavior in an initial decision
(e.g., Freedman and Fraser, 1966; Beaman et al., 1983; Cialdini
et al., 1995; Burger, 1999; Knez and Camerer, 2000; Fitzsimons
and Shiv, 2001; Cherry et al., 2003; Grimm and Mengel, 2012;
Baca-Motes et al., 2013; Brandon et al., 2017). As discussed
in the introduction, however, this literature identifies spillover
effects from a first decision on a second decision where the
first decision is conceptually different from the second. In our
study, both decisions involve giving to others, and are thus
highly similar. Moreover, as also discussed in the introduction,
choice defaults seem unlikely to favor mediating mechanisms for
positive spillovers such as self-efficacy (Steinhorst et al., 2015;
Lauren et al., 2016), cognitive accessibility (Sintov et al., 2019)
or self-signaling (Gneezy et al., 2012).
4. RESULTS
In presenting our results, we follow the structure of the
hypotheses laid out in section 3 by first testing whether our
default manipulations had a significant effect on giving in
Dictator Stage I (Hypothesis 1) and then testing whether the
choice defaults affected the spillover of giving in Dictator Stage
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I on giving in Dictator Stage II (Hypothesis 2). Finally, we
contrast the findings in the default treatments with behavior in
the different control conditions disentangling possible income
effects and altruistic motives from spillover effects arising from
giving in Dictator Stage I. A final regression analysis provides a
comprehensive overview of all the results that are concerned with
potential spillover effects.
As a first descriptive analysis, Table 2 provides an overview of
giving choices [in experimental points (ECU)] in Dictator Stage I
and II for all treatment and control conditions.6
4.1. Effects of Choice Defaults on Targeted
Behavior
4.1.1. The Effect of a Weak Default on Giving in
Dictator Stage I
Our weak default manipulation in Dictator Stage I had a
significant effect on donation levels. Participants in the WEAK
DEFAULT treatment donated on average 25% more than
participants in the NO DEFAULT condition (34.26 ECU vs.
27.44 ECU). Thus, in line with H1a, the pro-socially set weak
default marginally increased overall giving [t(256) = −1.92, p =
0.056, Cohen’s d = 0.24)].7 Furthermore, participants in the
WEAK DEFAULT treatment also had a marginally significant
higher prevalence of choosing exactly the pro-socially set default
amount (= 100 ECU) (11.6% in WEAK DEFAULT vs. 4.6%
in NO DEFAULT, z = 3.32, p = 0.069, n1 = 129,
n2 = 129).
The default effect can be further partitioned when considering
giving as a two-stage decision process. Participants first decide
whether they want to donate or not. Once chosen to donate,
they decide on the size of their gift (e.g., Moffatt, 2016, who
deems such an analysis particularly important for Dictator Game
data). Our default manipulation did not affect the number of
participants who decided to give nothing (24.8% in WEAK
DEFAULT vs. 24.8% in NO DEFAULT, z = 0.00, p = 1.000,
n1 = 129, n2 = 129). However, it did affect donation levels once
participants decided to give. Comparing only participants who
decided to give a positive amount, the effect of the weak default
holds. Donations in the WEAK DEFAULT treatment (45.57
ECU) are on average 25% higher than in the NO DEFAULT
treatment (36.49 ECU). This difference of 9.08 ECU is statistically
significant [t(192) = −2.45, p = 0.015].
4.1.2. The Effect of a Strong Default on Giving in
Dictator Stage I
In line with H1b, participants in the STRONG DEFAULT
treatment gave on average 114%more to charity than participants
in the NO DEFAULT treatment (58.99 ECU vs. 27.44 ECU).
Moreover, and in line with H1c, in Dictator Stage I, participants
in the STRONG DEFAULT treatment donated on average 72%
more to charity than participants in the WEAK DEFAULT
6The complete data-set and the R code for all analyses reported in the paper can be
downloaded from https://figshare.com/s/a5ed8c829c7c0c80e2f5
7Although, we have directed hypotheses, we rely on two-sided tests for all
inferential testing in this paper. We use t-tests to test for statistical significance of
differences in giving. Results from non-parametric Wilcoxon rank-sum tests yield
highly similar results and are available on request.
treatment (58.98 ECU vs. 34.26 ECU). Therefore, supporting
H1b and H1c our stronger default manipulation significantly
increased donation levels when compared to these two conditions
[STRONG DEFAULT vs. NO DEFAULT t(255) = −7.07, p <
0.001, Cohen’s d = 0.77; STRONG DEFAULT vs. WEAK
DEFAULT: t(255) = −5.20, p < 0.001, Cohen’s d =
0.54]. Furthermore, participants in the STRONG DEFAULT
treatment were also more likely to donate exactly the pre-set
default amount when compared to participants in the WEAK
DEFAULT treatment and when compared to participants in the
NO DEFAULT treatment (proportion tests: 49.6% in STRONG
DEFAULT vs. 4.6% NO DEFAULT: z = 63.70, p < 0.001, n1 =
128, n2 = 129; 49.6% in STRONGDEFAULT vs. 11.6% inWEAK
DEFAULT: z = 42.04, p < 0.001, n1 = 128, n2 = 129). However,
our strong default manipulation did not affect the number of
participants who decided to give nothing (22.65% in STRONG
DEFAULT vs. 24.8% in NO DEFAULT: z = 0.07, p = 0.796,
n1 = 129, n2 = 129; 22.65% in STRONG DEFAULT vs. 24.8%
WEAK DEFAULT: z = 0.07, p = 0.796, n1 = 129, n2 = 129).
Nevertheless, the strong default did affect donation
levels once participants decided to give a positive amount.
Participants who gave a positive amount to charity donated
on average 67% more in STRONG DEFAULT (76.26 ECU)
compared with participants in the WEAK DEFAULT
treatment (45.57 ECU). This difference of 30.69 ECU is
statistically significant [t(194) = −6.86, p < 0.001]. Further,
participants in the STRONG DEFAULT treatment (ECU
76.26) gave on average 109% more than participants in
NO DEFAULT treatment (36.49 ECU). This difference of
39.77 ECU is again statistically significant [t(194) = −9.58,
p < 0.001].
4.2. Spillover Effects
4.2.1. The Spillover Effect of Giving in the Weak
Default Treatment in Dictator Stage I on Giving in
Dictator Stage II
In order to assess the spillover effect from giving in a weak
default regime in stage one to giving behavior in stage two
(H2a), we compare giving in Dictator Stage II between the
WEAK DEFAULT and NO DEFAULT treatments. Table 2
reveals that participants in both treatments gave about one
fifth of their endowment to the paired recipient. In the NO
DEFAULT treatment, participants gave 35.89 ECU (18% of their
endowment). In the WEAK DEFAULT treatment, average giving
amounted to 39.69 ECU (20% of the endowment). The difference
of less than 4 ECU is not statistically significant [t(256) = −0.80,
p = 0.427, Cohen’s d = 0.10]. There is thus no support for H2a,
as we do not find a significant spillover effect in the weak default
treatment. We summarize this finding as our first result:
Result 1. There are no behavioral spillover effects from giving
in stage one in the WEAK DEFAULT treatment on subsequent
giving. Higher initial giving in Dictator Stage I in the WEAK
DEFAULT treatment does not lead to lower giving in Dictator Stage
II compared with the NO DEFAULT treatment.
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TABLE 2 | Summary statistics.
Giving (ECU)
Treatments N Dictator Stage I Dictator Stage II
NO DEFAULT 129 27.44 (25.38) 35.89 (36.80)
WEAK DEFAULT 129 34.26 (31.47) 39.69 (39.80)
STRONG DEFAULT 128 58.98 (43.82) 40.94 (43.15)
Control Conditions N Dictator Stage II
CONTROL INCOME (NO DEFAULT matching) 49 – 39.39 (44.32)
CONTROL INCOME (WEAK DEFAULT matching) 49 – 40.20 (40.59)
CONTROL INCOME (STRONG DEFAULT matching) 50 – 50.80 (42.71)
CONTROL PASSIVE GIVING (NO DEFAULT matching) 46 – 34.57 (39.87)
CONTROL PASSIVE GIVING (WEAK DEFAULT matching) 46 – 43.70 (39.80)
CONTROL PASSIVE GIVING (STRONG DEFAULT matching) 52 – 43.65 (40.44)
Giving is denoted in ECU. Standard deviations are in parentheses. The data for the six control conditions are split into the respective income matching category, i.e., NO DEFAULT,
WEAK DEFAULT, STRONG DEFAULT.
4.3. The Effect of Giving in the Strong
Default Treatment in Dictator Stage I on
Giving in Dictator Stage II
Table 2 documents that participants in the STRONG DEFAULT
treatment also gave about one fifth of their endowment to the
other recipient. This is very similar to the amounts given by
participants in the WEAK DEFAULT treatment and the NO
DEFAULT treatment. In fact, there are no differences in Dictator
Stage II giving between treatments that are statistically significant
[WEAK DEFAULT vs. STRONG DEFAULT: t(255) = −0.24, p =
0.810, Cohen’s d = 0.03; NO DEFAULT vs. STRONG DEFAULT
t(255) = −1.01, p = 0.314, Cohen’s d = 0.13], and there is thus
no support for either H2b or H2c. It does not seem to be the case
that choice defaults on giving in Dictator Stage I lead to moral
licensing in Dictator Stage II. We summarize these findings in
our second result:
Result 2. There are no behavioral spillover effects from giving
in stage one in the STRONG DEFAULT treatment on subsequent
giving. Higher initial giving in Dictator Stage I in the STRONG
DEFAULT treatment does not lead to lower giving in Dictator Stage
II compared with the NO DEFAULT treatment.
Figure 2 illustrates the findings presented so-far. Figure 2A of
the figure illustrates the statistically significant impact of both the
weak and the strong default on giving in Dictator Stage I (with the
STRONG DEFAULT condition adding a significant increase to
donation levels compared to the WEAK DEFAULT). Figure 2B
of the figure shows that in the untreated Dictator Stage II no
differential spillover of the initial decision can be observed, as
we do not find significant differences between the experimental
conditions.
4.4. Income and Altruistic Motivations
To put our results concerning potential spillover effects to a more
conservative test and to ensure the robustness of our findings, we
employed a two-tiered control strategy. Solely comparing choices
in the NO DEFAULT treatment with choices in the WEAK
DEFAULT treatment and the STRONG DEFAULT treatment
in Dictator Stage II may omit relevant differences between the
treatments related to income effects and altruistic motivations.
Specifically, because of their donation decision, participants
arrived with different amounts of money in Dictator Stage II in
the default treatments compared with participants in the NO
DEFAULT treatment. This, on the one hand, impacts income
of participants in the default treatments. On the other hand,
motivations of altruism may also be affected by the higher
donations in Dictator Stage I in the default treatments. To control
for pure income effects, we employ the CONTROL INCOME
condition in which participants did not make a donation decision
in Dictator Stage I but had the same income as participants
in the default treatments when they made their decisions in
Dictator Stage II. To control also for altruistic motivations, we
conducted the CONTROL PASSIVEGIVING condition in which
participants also had the same income as participants in the
default treatments in Dictator Stage I, but without having made
an active donation in Stage I and instead simply learning that a
donation was made to a charity (and in which amount) to keep
altruistic utility constant. We compare giving in Dictator Stage
II in these conditions to giving in in Dictator Stage II in the NO
DEFAULT treatment and the WEAK DEFAULT and STRONG
DEFAULT treatment respectively.
The results from our control conditions further support
Results 1 and 2. Participants’ choices in the NO DEFAULT
treatment and the WEAK DEFAULT treatment were not
significantly different to those of the matched cases in the
CONTROL INCOME condition and the CONTROL PASSIVE
GIVING condition [NO DEFAULT (35.89 ECU) vs. CONTROL
INCOME (39.39 ECU): t(176) = −0.53, p = 0.594; NO
DEFAULT (35.89 ECU) vs. CONTROL PASSIVE GIVING (34.57
ECU): t(173) = 0.21, p = 0.838; WEAK DEFAULT (39.69
ECU) vs. CONTROL INCOME (40.20 ECU): t(176) = 0.08,
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FIGURE 2 | Choices in Dictator Stage I and II. Panel (A) Shows giving decisions (mean points donated to charities) in Dictator Stage I for NO DEFAULT, WEAK
DEFAULT and STRONG DEFAULT. Panel (B) Shows mean giving (points given to recipient) in the Dictator Stage II for the three treatment conditions. Error-bars denote
plus/minus one standard error of the mean.
p = 0.939; WEAK DEFAULT (39.69 ECU) vs. CONTROL
PASSIVE GIVING (43.70 ECU): t(173) = 0.57, p = 0.567].
Similarly, supporting Result 2, participants’ choices in the
STRONGDEFAULT treatment were not significantly different to
those in the CONTROL INCOME condition or the CONTROL
PASSIVE GIVING condition [STRONG DEFAULT (40.94 ECU)
vs. CONTROL INCOME (50.8 ECU): t(176) = 1.37, p = 0.171;
STRONG DEFAULT (40.94 ECU) vs. CONTROL PASSIVE
GIVING (43.65 ECU): t(178) = 0.39, p = 0.697].
8
Thus, putting potential spillover-effects to a more rigorous
test by controlling for altruistic motivations and income effects
reinforces our Results 1 and 2. Neither different incomes nor
different altruistic motivations resulting from higher giving in
Dictator Stage I seem to impact giving in Dictator Stage II.
As a final step, in Table 3 we report the results from
regression analyses allowing to analyze whether spillover effects
differed between the experimental conditions when controlling
for potential income effects at the individual level. Note
that for the pairwise comparisons of the default treatments
to the CONTROL INCOME and the CONTROL PASSIVE
GIVING conditions based on t-tests reported above, we had
to split the observations from the CONTROL INCOME
and CONTROL PASSIVE GIVING conditions into groups
matching the respective treatment conditions (see Appendix B
in Supplementary Material for details). The splitting into groups
was conducted randomly, but it reduces statistical power. The
regression approach avoids this splitting and has the advantage
that instead we can simply add the individual monetary income
a participant had received in the experiment up to Dictator Stage
8For the t-tests reported in this section, we only considered the exact matches of
income for each treatment condition in order to ensure perfect comparability. In
the regressions reported in Table 3we use the full data from the control conditions
when controlling for possible income effects and can thus increase statistical
power.
II as a control variable. This increases statistical power and thus
provides an even stronger test of the findings we have established
in section 4.2.
In the regressions reported in Table 3, the variable “Income
before DG II” captures the monetary income a participant had
earned in the experiment before making the giving decision in
Dictator Stage II. We include dummies for our experimental
conditions, with the NO DEFAULT treatment being the omitted
base category. We interact the dummies for the experimental
conditions with the “Income before DG II” variable to allow
for the likely possibility that the effects of this variable are
different between the experimental conditions. The reason is
that the “income” with which a participant arrived in Dictator
Stage II was endogenously determined through participants’
giving in the NO DEFAULT, WEAK DEFAULT, and STRONG
DEFAULT treatments, whereas it was exogenously assigned
through the matching procedure in the CONTROL INCOME
and CONTROL PASSIVE GIVING conditions.9
The treatment dummies in the regressions reported in Table 3
can be interpreted straightforwardly as capturing a difference in
9In this vein, note that the main effect coefficients for “Income before DG II” in
the regressions reported in Table 3 do not capture a causal income effect. Because
the regressions also contain the interaction terms of this variable with the dummies
for the experimental conditions, the coefficients for “Income before DG II” apply to
the NO DEFAULT treatment, in which the “income” (i.e., the money a participant
had earned in the experiment before entering Dictator Stage II) was determined
by the participant’s own donation decision in Dictator Stage I. Thus, the negative
coefficients we find in the regressions are due to self-selection (as participants with
a tendency to give little in Dictator Stage I also give little in Dictator Stage II).
A causal income effect can be estimated in the CONTROL INCOME condition
and corresponds to testing that the sum of the coefficients for “Income before
DG II” and the interaction term “CONTROL INCOME x Income before DG II”
is different from zero. We do not find evidence for a significant income effect on
average giving in Dictator Stage II (p = 0.967, post-estimation F-test based on OLS
results). The corresponding test for the CONTROL PASSIVE GIVING condition
reveals that there is also no significant income effect when adding altruistic utility
(p = 0.938, post-estimation F-test).
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TABLE 3 | Regression models: giving in dictator stage II.
DV: Giving to Recipient OLS LPM gamma-GLM
Two-part model
Intercept 40.806*** 0.738*** 4.008***
(3.742) (0.043) (0.066)
WEAK DEFAULT 2.379 −0.042 0.085
(5.051) (0.057) (0.091)
STRONG DEFAULT −4.361 −0.199*** 0.215**
(5.413) (0.062) (0.104)
CONTROL INCOME 2.709 −0.069 0.168**
(5.150) (0.058) (0.087)
CONTROL PASSIVE
GIVING
−0.051 −0.065 0.096
(5.091) (0.059) (0.090)
Income before DG II −13.600*** −0.218*** −0.052
(4.972) (0.059) (0.102)
WEAK DEFAULT × Income
before DG II
−6.239 −0.036 −0.067
(6.376) (0.075) (0.126)
STRONG DEFAULT ×
Income before DG II
4.523 0.074 0.070
(5.819) (0.069) (0.120)
CONTROL INCOME ×
Income before DG II
13.736** 0.240*** 0.023
(6.119) (0.071) (0.114)
CONTROL PASSIVE
GIVING × Income before
DG II
13.342** 0.196*** 0.074
(6.079) (0.071) (0.118)
Observations 678 678 443
R2 0.059 0.085 –
F(9, 668) / F(9, 668)/ χ2(9) 4.706 6.899 7.299
+p < 0.10; *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.0001. Robust standard errors are
in parentheses. The dependent variable is giving to the recipient in Dictator Stage II.
NO DEFAULT is the omitted treatment captured by the intercepts. “Income before DG
II” represents the (mean-centered) monetary income a participant had earned in the
experiment when arriving at Dictator Stage II (partly endogenously determined in NO
DEFAULT, WEAK DEFAULT, and STRONG DEFAULT, exogenously assigned in control
treatments). Gamma-GLM estimates are on a log-scale. The two-part model fits the
data better than the OLS specification subsuming the complete data. The combined log-
likelihood of the two-part model is –2628.207 compared to –3454.219 of the OLS. The
table was compiled using the “stargazer” tool by Hlavac (2018).
giving in Dictator Stage II between the respective treatment and
the omitted base category, the NO DEFAULT condition, while
controlling for income effects. The non-significant coefficients
for the treatment dummies for WEAK DEFAULT and STRONG
DEFAULT in the OLS regression thus indicate that, on average
and compared to the NO DEFAULT treatment, neither a weak
nor a strong default in the initial donation decision in Dictator
Stage I led to different giving decisions in Dictator Stage II. Thus,
despite the defaults significantly affecting the giving decisions in
Dictator Stage I, there was no spillover effect of this increased
giving in Dictator Stage I on Dictator Stage II. There were also
no significant differences according to the OLS regression when
comparing WEAK DEFAULT and STRONG DEFAULT to the
two control conditions and WEAK DEFAULT and STRONG
DEFAULT with each other (p > .100 for all post-estimation
F-tests for these comparisons). The low R2 values correspond
to this lack of statistically significant differences between the
experimental treatments.
Additionally, we again analyze the data on giving decisions in
Dictator Stage II as a two-step decision process. This analysis is
based on the assumption that participants first decide whether to
give something at all and then decide, in a second step, howmuch
to give. In a regression analysis, this two-stage decision process
is most closely captured by a a two-part model (see Moffatt,
2016). To implement the two-part regression, we used a linear
probability model (LPM) to model the binary decision to give
any positive amount to the recipient in a first, and subsequently a
gamma-GLM to assess how much a participant gave (conditional
on giving a positive amount) in a second step. As the LPM
results reported in the corresponding column of Table 3 indicate,
compared to the NO DEFAULT treatment, the STRONG
DEFAULT treatment significantly reduced the number of people
who chose to give a positive amount to the recipient in Dictator
Stage II. This negative effect is also significant when comparing
the STRONG DEFAULT treatment to WEAK DEFAULT (p =
0.009), CONTROL INCOME (p = 0.024), and CONTROL
PASSIVE GIVING (p = 0.021) using post-estimation F-tests.
However, those participants in STRONGDEFAULT who did give
something to the recipient, gave more than participants in NO
DEFAULT, thus leading to the non-significantly different giving
on average that we found in the OLS regression. Comparing
the gamma-GLM coefficient of the dummy for the STRONG
DEFAULT treatment to those of the two control conditions
and to WEAK DEFAULT, we find that, conditional on giving a
positive amount, there were no significant differences in giving
across these conditions (p > 0.100 for all post-estimation
Wald tests).
Thus, in sum, also the regression analyses confirm that, on
average, neither the weak nor the strong default in our study
led to negative spillover effects from initial giving choices on
subsequent giving choices on average. The results from the two-
part model provide some additional interesting insights, as the
STRONG DEFAULT decreased the number of people willing to
give anything in Dictator Stage II. However, this negative effect
of the strong default on the propensity to give was compensated
by higher giving by those participants who still decided to
give something.
5. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
In this study, we investigated the potential spillover effects
of increased pro-social behavior triggered by pro-social choice
defaults on not directly targeted, subsequent behavior. To do so,
we contrasted subsequent pro-social behavior when there was
no default, an easily changeable “weak” default, and a costly to
switch “strong” default implemented to foster an initial pro-social
behavior. We tested the potential spillover effects of behavior
triggered by these choice defaults on subsequent behavior by
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applying a two-tiered control strategy taking into account
potentially countervailing effects of different income levels and
altruistic motivations stemming from the initial behavior.
Our findings provide important insights for policymakers and
researchers alike. They carry good news for policymakers who
make use of choice defaults for fostering pro-social choices,
because both the non-obtrusive (weak) and the costly to switch
(strong) default we implemented in our study did not cause
problematic effects over time. Overall, the increase in pro-social
giving triggered by the choice defaults did not lead participants
to compensate and reduce their giving in a later choice without a
default. Even though the STRONGDEFAULT led to fewer people
making a positive transfer in Dictator Stage II, this effect was
compensated by higher transfers by those participants who still
decided to give something. Thus, while as intended—and in line
with a large and growing literature documenting the effectiveness
of choice defaults—the defaults we implemented in our study had
a significant positive effect on the targeted pro-social behavior,
there was no moral licensing in the form of negative spillover
effects on subsequent behavior.
Our findings are further encouraging, because the increase
in pro-social giving in Dictator Stage I triggered by the choice
defaults was large, especially when considering the strong default
treatment. The strong default more than doubled giving in
Dictator Stage I compared to the no default condition and the
effect size was large according to typical measures (Cohen’s
d = 0.74). These findings are important for researchers studying
moral licensing. Given the existing literature on moral licensing,
it is noteworthy that an intervention that increases pro-social
behavior so strongly does not lead to any compensation in
subsequent pro-social behavior. The absence of spillovers is even
more notable given that the two behaviors were temporally very
close to each other as they took place within a relatively short-
lived laboratory session.
It could be argued that some features of our experimental
design, specifically the filler task and the nature of the giving
decision in Dictator Stage II, may have facilitated participants
viewing the decisions as unrelated and thus favored the absence
of spillovers. However, even though our observations and
inferences are of course limited to the specific experimental
set-up we implemented, we believe that this set-up provided
an appropriate environment for detecting relevant spillover
effects of pro-social behavior triggered by choice defaults on
subsequent and similar pro-social decisions. First, the filler
task lasted a maximum of 180 seconds during the conduct
of the experiment. Hence, if it is the case that distractions,
like filler tasks, are sufficient to eliminate potential spillover
effects, it is unlikely that such spillovers are actually relevant
in real-life decision making where the time that passes between
potentially linked decisions is likely to be longer. Moreover,
the use of filler tasks is common in studies following the
sequential behavior paradigm, in order to ensure sufficient
differentiation between initial and subsequent behavior (e.g.,
Sachdeva et al., 2009; Gneezy et al., 2012). Second, even though
the recipient in the Dictator Game implemented in Dictator
Stage II (another participant) was different than in Dictator
Stage I (where it was a charity), conceptually the two decisions
were highly similar. Both times the participants received a sum
of money and decided how much to give to someone else.
Previous studies have found negative or positive spillovers with
behaviors that seem conceptually far more different than that,
such as, for instance, saving water and electricity consumption
(Tiefenbeck et al., 2013) or making a donation and telling
the truth (Gneezy et al., 2012). Moreover, when designing the
experiment we deliberately decided to implement a slightly
different decision in Dictator Stage II compared to Dictator
Stage I, as this case seems more relevant from a practical
perspective. In reality, it is probably rarely the case that an
individual faces the exact same pro-social decision again right
away and that the first time it was subject to a choice default,
whereas the second time it is not. Rather, and more relevantly
from our perspective, the individual will likely face other pro-
social decisions that are similar in the sense that they have
a pro-social dimension to them, but that are not exactly the
same. Thus, if behavioral spillovers matter for the overall
effect of choice defaults on pro-social behavior, these spillover
effects would need to be observed not on the exact same
decision, but rather on related and similar—but not exactly
identical—decisions.
Based on our data, we thus conclude that fostering pro-
social decisions via the use of choice defaults—with or
without significant costs to opt out—does not seem to
influence non-targeted subsequent pro-social behavior. This is
an encouraging finding for policy makers wanting to stimulate
pro-social behavior via choice defaults, but fearing subsequent
adverse effects.
Of course, our study is just a first step in the analysis of
whether and how well-intended behavioral policy interventions
such as choice defaults affect other, not directly targeted decisions
and the potential spillover effects of choice defaults and other
nudges should be investigated further in future research. One
research question that should be explored in more detail is how
spillover effects of such interventions depend on the nature of
the subsequent behavior. As argued above, behavioral spillover
effects seem to be of particular practical relevance if they occur
not only on exactly identical subsequent decisions but also
on related but not identical decisions. In general, it would be
important to explore more systematically how this relatedness
between behaviors affects spillover effects and what determines
relatedness. Moreover, subsequent behavior may be due to and
exposed to a large variety of contextual factors from which
we abstracted in our laboratory study. Given the increasing
popularity of nudging policies, it is important to increase our
understanding about any desirable or undesirable side-effects
such policy interventions may have. Especially, the evaluation
of behavioral spillover effects of nudges in field-experimental
settings would be important in this regard.
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